(work regulation) raises questions about what should be the objective, extent and form of employee access to and influence on decision making within the firm. (2) . Freeman and Lazear (1995) findings suggest that neither workers neither employers' have incentives to voluntary create work councils. The distributional effect will lead workers to demand degree of empowerment that exceeds social optimum. Socially optimal levels of co.
determination may be prevented by the existence of high fixed costs of establishing councils (3) As Fitz Roy and Kraft (2005) show the effect on co.determination on productivity, job satisfaction variable and efficiency (4) .
Information is the basic resource in decision making (Gospel, Willman 2004) .There exists pervasive asymmetry of information between the employer and employee. Economic value of the council can be modelled as communicator from management to workers. There is a social benefit from good information that maximizes the utility of employees and employers. Full information disclosure will enable workers to respond flexibility whether firm is in a good or bad state (5) . Expected utility of workers; working independently of the state of the firm (good or bad) i.e. just working normally is given (6) .Alternatively if workers are indifferent between N and F(Normal and Fast) it is defined p* probability as lies between 0 and 1 since Exchange of information is legally mandated, work councils can enhance the flow of information from workers to management. Joint consultation becomes communication vehicle for management to provide general information about the state of the organization. Employee councils have been introduced to a large number of organizations not just to integrate consultative and negotiating process but to do "employee" rather than "union" presentation. Increasing size of the employee council can improve accuracy of information, work councils' improve enterprise surplus when they have limited and definite power in the enterprise. Information obtained by the union sets must yield higher joint surplus than the information's provided in the disjointed sets. Work councils, are mandated rights over the level of employment, employee surplus division, working conditions. On long run this increases the level of job.security. Job.security is higher valued work.outcome by the workers according to the study of Clark (2005) . Job security can resolve the adverse selection problem and raise economic efficiency i.e. worker or agent will work efficiently or Table 2 Co.determined third parity so.determined and non.codetermined firms and Section D Table 3 Cobb Douglas production function 5 See Appendix 1 Section E Gains from information disclosure as a function of p 6 P % of the time workers are right working normally N and receive utility UN while (1.P) % of the time they are wrong and receive utility U0 (Akerlof, 1976) .Which will reduce the opportunistic or Results from an empirical study of (Bauer T. 2004) showed that opportunity to participate in decision making, communication with co.
workers have positive impact on the welfare of the employees. What makes the contracts incomplete is the long.
run relationship between principal and agent and element of uncertainty and risk in the relation. If contracts are incomplete allocating some control rights to employees may be optimal, as they may be willing to develop firms' specific capital. And on the long run monitoring costs cumulative increase; that is why job security legislation should be self.enforcing in other words there will be low cost for litigation. Collective bargaining is based on the manifestation of power and counter power between employer association and trade union. Co.determination requires limitation of managerial discretion to manage. However some limitation should be placed on the power of work councils (Freeman Lazear 1995) .Employee consultation it is legally required, communication through joint consultative or works committee on average is increasing(downward and upward communication) (7) .Geary distinguishes between participation upward communication and participation i.e.
participation designed into peoples' jobs. Co.determination reinforces well functioning social democracy, recent studies discover that consultation and participation increase than innovativeness of the company. The study by
Hubler and Jirjahn (2003) showed that the presence of work councils exerts positive impact on productivity within the covered industrial relations regime.
π(e*,w*) = F(N), π (e**,w**) = (1+θ ) F(N) /3, π (e*,w*) -CB= F(N) -CB, π (e***,w***) -CB NU(e*,w*) = 0 NU(e**,w**) -CW = NU(e*,w*) = 0 (1+θ+2a)F(N)/3.CB (1+ θ) 2 F(N) /9 -CW NU(e***,w***) -CW= (1+θ. a) 2 (N) /9 -CW 7 See Appendix 1 Section F e-is effort, w-wage; CW-costs; CB-costs;
Game Tree
The employer will be a member of an employers' association if the cost of coverage the collective agreement are offset by the advantage of discouraging the rent seeking behaviour of the work council. A study of Mizrahi, Shlomo (2002) argues that firms efficiency, stability and workers participation can be achieved through participatory decision rules therefore government intervention is considered to be marginal throughout. Relying on the rationales developed by the new.institutional economics long.run relationships between employer and employees are essential for the firms' existence and stability. This explains the advantages of the social contract although in the market can be achieved without it but under assumption of perfect competition in the market. The firms in capitalist market economies face profit maximising constraint, and high involvement of employees to increase their share in the firm's surplus, leading to inefficiency. From managerial perspective there is optimal level of involvement which is not always must be maximum level of involvement (Mizrahi, 2002) .
Economic studies show that economic benefits tend to be higher; the higher the level of participation and where there is financial participation through profit sharing and or ownership stakes (Hodgson Jones).Employment law is often labelled as either i.e the law relating to the employee.employer relationship, or i.e. waivable worker rights. According to common law employer can be dismissed without reason and has no protection against it (Robinson, Fox, 1985) . In EU all the member states have the level of protection or eligibility if the dismissal is unfair. Corporatist contest the argument that job security legislation and centralized co.ordinated bargaining produces hysteresis i.e. downward inflexibility (the Beveridge curve) in the relationship between vacancies and unemployment. Some suggest that deregulatory pressures are inevitable in the labour market, reflecting the changes in the industrial organization, implying looser organization and dualism, between a protected core of multiskilled employees and adjustable periphery of contract workers and an adjustable periphery of contract workers in an era of post.Fordist flexibility (Rhodes, 1992) . Most EU legislation that affects employment law is introduced in the form of directives. Directives are legislative instruments that require member state to translate the contents of the directive into national law (Lewis, Sargeant, 2000) . European Work Council Directive (EWC) (8) gave embodiment of the European model of representation that covers transnational companies that work in EU. The directive's basic requirement is am establishment of a procedure for information and consultation between workers and the firm (Hogler, 1996) . Directive avoids any linkage between trade unions and representation. Even though directive is transnational in its scope, it contemplates decentralized schemes by which parties can make local agreements to satisfy the law. Directive's policy rationale derives from the social charter, social interest are indispensable adjunct to economic project. Social charter previously was considered important for workers' rights protection (Teague, 1993) . Central of this philosophy is the theme of partnership that is meant to encourage employee commitment, epitomized in German Co.
determination Act (1976) This table shows that the sign on the co.determination variable is positive and statistically significant and his economic influence on the productivity and efficiency is also significant. , 
